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I. INTRODUCTION
Professional licensing is widely criticized for creating state-sponsored cartels
that frustrate competition and drive up the cost of professional services.1
Regulatory reform has been aimed at promoting competition while at the same
time invigorating licensing's ostensible function: the effective self-regulation of
competence by members of a profession. 2 Yet professional licensing creates other
costs to society that are not widely appreciated. This Article seeks to demonstrate
those costs in the context of one profession, medicine, and one well-publicized
but poorly understood problem within that profession, the withholding of life-
sustaining treatment from handicapped infants.
Licensing of physicians does more than create an economic monopoly over
the provision of medical services. It presumes professional expertise and lay
incompetence in making decisions about health. This legal presumption, found
throughout the legal regulation of health care, in turn embodies the medical
* Associate with the Washington D.C. law firm of Stein, Mitchell & Mezines. B.A.,
University of Kansas (1972), J.D., Yale Law School (1984).
For the classic argument, see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962).
2 See generally IssuEs IN HEALTH CARE REGULATION (R. Gordon ed. 1980); REGULATING
THE PROFESSIONS, A PUBLIC POLICY SYMPOSIUM (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 1:77
profession's own presumption that illness is mainly an organic, individual-
centered phenomenon for which expert treatment is appropriate. The medical
profession's notions of the nature of illness, or what could be called the medical
model, thus pervade the legal structure of health care. The issue of medical
infanticide3 illustrates the consequences of a system of laws that enshrines the
medical profession's understanding of illness as society's official understanding.
Because the medical model of illness rests on an individualized concept of
health divorced from the social roots of illness, the issue of handicapped in-
fants has been largely perceived in similarly individualized terms. The focus
of attention has been on what kind of medical treatment individual infants are
to receive, and how society can assure ethical decisions by doctors and parents
on behalf of those individual infants.4 This individualized focus ignores the issue
of the extent to which society is obliged to prevent handicaps and ameliorate
their consequences.
In making individual decisions, physicians have claimed an expertise that the
laws have enforced. The theory of professional expertise underlying both the
3 The practice is also commonly, but imprecisely, referred to as pediatric euthanasia.
Euthanasia means death that is beneficial, i.e., a "mercy killing." But the benefit must
be to the person who dies, not someone else. Foot, Euthanasia, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
85, 86 (1977). Commentators often have failed to make this distinction and thus have
used the term in a conclusory and confusing way that begs a central question in the
debate about handicapped newborns. See id. at 108-10 (arguing that withholding treat-
ment is often not euthanasia because it is intended to benefit not infant but family or
society).
Infanticide is the deliberate killing of an infant, without regard to motive, see BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 699 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), and thus can refer generally to the withholding
of treatment when the caregiver knows that treatment would keep the infant alive. This
article will adopt the term infanticide.
I This has been the focus of the Reagan administration's regulatory efforts aimed
at the infanticide problem. The Article does not analyze those efforts. Instead, it seeks
to place the infanticide issue into the broader context of the legal regulation of the medical
profession.
Last term, Congress passed compromise legislation that, among other things, re-
quires states receiving federal child abuse funds to establish procedures for responding
to reports of the withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with
life-threatening conditions. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98
Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5102-5104). The act also defines "medically
indicated treatment" and directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to publish
model guidelines to encourage the establishment of committees within hospitals to offer
counseling and review of cases involving handicapped infants. For legislative history,
see S. Rep. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-11, 16-19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2918; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2947.
For a summary of the regulatory efforts of the Reagan administration leading up
to the legislation, see Pearl, Baby Jane and Infant Doe: Treatment of Newborns with
Birth Defects, 16 URBAN LAWYER 701 (1984). See also United States v. University Hosp.,
729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting Reagan administration's use of §504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to investigate hospital where treatment withheld from newborn with spina bifida);
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983) (striking
down rules establishing hotline and requiring posters to be posted in hospital nurseries).
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medical model and the legal regulation of health care declares the incompetence
of non-physicians - whether patients, legal representatives of patients such
as parents, or other health care workers such as nurses - to judge the work
of physicians. Individual physicians have been ceded effective control of deci-
sions made about ill infants by allowing doctors both to dominate parents and
to remain largely independent from outside review.
This Article tries to explicate the way in which legal regulation interacts with
the medical profession's theories of health and illness in order to construct the
social reality of health care and of specific issues such as infanticide. Part II
of the Article demonstrates how the professional autonomy granted to medicine
by the legal system makes possible professional domination over individual deci-
sions and reinforces a societal view of health issues compatible with continued
medical dominance. Part III shows how this legal dominance expresses itself
in the infanticide context. Part IV analyzes basic flaws in the presumptions
underlying the legal system of autonomy, as illustrated again by the infanticide
example. The Article concludes that professional authority over health matters
has been vastly overextended but that reclaiming lay control will require a serious
re-examination of the basic legal structure of health care.
II. THE ROLE Or PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY
The legal regulation of health care has established physicians as autonomous,
self-regulated professionals. But legal regulation has gone much further and has
given the medical profession dominion not only over the work of other health
care occupations, but also over the decisions made on behalf of patients, and
even society's basic conceptions of health and illness.
A. The Legal Presumption of Professional Autonomy and its Justification
Football players, musicians, journalists and members of a variety of other
occupations requiring unique skills developed by arduous training often call
themselves "professionals." I use the term more narrowly to refer to that class
of occupations whose members are granted exclusive licenses by the state to
practice their craft and who decide as a group the qualifications an individual
needs to become licensed.5 Law and medicine are the classic examples of pro-
fessions in this sense of state-granted autonomy from lay control.
Licensing is the bedrock supporting a system of professional autonomy.
American medicine won professional status in the late nineteenth century with
the passage of state licensing laws. The licensing led to the closure of large
I Research on the sociology of work usually has focused on the official grant of
autonomy as separating professions from other occupations. See, e.g., E. FREIDSON, PRO-
FESSIONAL DOMINANCE 83 (1970); W. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 15-16
(1970).
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numbers of medical schools and the decline of various alternative forms of heal-
ing that had competed with medical physicians.6 Like other occupations, 7
medicine actively sought licensure, though the ostensible reason for licensing
was to protect the public health, not the profession itself.8
A Supreme Court hostile to legislative protection of labor unions9 and most
other trade groups 0 accepted the rationale for medical licensure. In the 1889
case of Dent v. West Virginia," the Court said:
Every one may have occasion to consult him [the physician], but com-
paratively few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which
he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his
license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect, that
he possesses the requisite qualifications. 12
This is the core premise underlying professional autonomy - that laymen
are not equipped to judge what experts do in their behalf. The layman thus
cannot tell a competent expert from a charlatan, and the expert cannot prove
his or her expertise without educating the layman in the expert's craft. Licens-
ing transfers the task of persuading the layman to submit to treatment from
the individual level of professional/client to the institutional level of profes-
sion/legislature.13 Clients, who may be in great need but ignorant, are assured
that they can trust licensed professionals, less by the persuasive power of the
6 For the history of the licensing movement, see J. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPO-
LY (1975); P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 102-07 (1982).
7 See W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 109 (1956).
I See R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 43 (1971).
9 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating federal "yellow dog"
contract restriction); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state law barr-
ing "yellow dog" contracts); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (invalidating state
law restricting use of injunctions in labor disputes).
10 The best known example is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), invalidating
a 60-hour limit on the work week of bakers. The majority opinion cited with approval
three state court opinions invalidating statutes licensing horseshoers, id. at 63, without
mentioning or distinguishing its own opinion 16 years earlier approving state licensure
of physicians. See also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down
minimum wage law for women). But see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)(upholding maximum working hours provision for women); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366 (1898) (upholding maximum hours for coal miners).
1' 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
12 Id. at 122-23.
13 See E. FREIDSON, supra note 5, at 108-10. This type of authority stands somewhere
between the personal authority of the expert and the legal authority of an office-holder.
A scientist obtains authority by virtue of his personal demonstration to his peers, e.g.,
through scholarly writing, that he is an expert. On the other hand, the legal authority
of an office-holder, such as a judge, is based not on expertise but on the powers inherent
in the office. The physician exercises expert authority, but at least in relations with his
patients, it is won not by virtue of any personal demonstration but by the imputation
from his credentials (in a sense, his office) that he is an expert. The distinctions are
developed by Talcott Parsons and Eliot Freidson. See id. at 123-25.
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individual practitioner than by the persuasive authority of the institution that
gave the practitioner credentials. 14
Licensing is not simply a certification by the state that the practitioner meets
minimum standards of competence. The state could provide such certification
and still leave patients free to choose non-certified practitioners. Instead, all
the states have licensing systems that forbid medical treatment by anyone
without a license. Licensing laws typically allow other health care professionals
such as nurses, and physical therapists to treat patients only pursuant to physi-
cians' orders and supervision.' 5 This state-enforced monopoly removes from
patients the choice of whether to seek out someone other than a licensed prac-
titioner for their health problems. Thus, not only does licensure presume lay
incompetence at judging the qualifications of professionals, it also presumes
that lay persons cannot judge whether their own health problems require the
services of a licensed physician or someone with different training.
Even if one presumes such pervasive lay incompetence, licensing becomes
the inevitable mechanism for assuring physician competence only if one also
assumes that medical care should be provided to patients by individual con-
tract between doctor and patient. This is not the only way to provide medical
services. The state itself could hire doctors to work in state-owned hospitals
and clinics, insuring competence through hiring and firing rather than through
licensing. Even without state-provided medical care, entities such as private
hospitals rather than individual physicians could become the locus of payment
by patients and regulation by the state. The state could license such institu-
tions, and each institution would bear the responsibility of assuring the quality
of its employees.16 Licensing of individual physicians is necessary only when
the physician answers to no employer other than himself or herself. Given alter-
natives such as state provision of care or institutional licensure, individual licen-
sure maximizes the control by individual physicians over physician/patient rela-
tionships and minimizes control by outsiders.
The presumption of lay incompetence underlying licensing is not limited to
patients. Licensing also presumes that the state itself is incompetent to regulate
14 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889) (licensing laws intended to pro-
mote professional competence so that "the community might trust with confidence those
receiving a license under the authority of the State.")
15 See Dolan, Antitrust Law and Physician Dominance of Other Health Practitioners,
4 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y. & L., 675, 677 (1980). Increasingly, these other professions have
challenged the dominance of physicians, but with limited success. Generally, licensing
statutes allow nurse practitioners, physician's assistants and other "allied health profes-
sionals" to practice only under some kind of physician supervision. See Rayack, Medical
Licensure: Social Costs and Social Benefits, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 152-54 (1983);
F. GRAD & N. MARTI, PHYSICIANs' LICENSURE & DISCIPLINE 131-33 (1979); Kucera & Man-
son, Allied Health Professions: An Opportunity and a Challenge, 16 FORUM 787, 789
(1981). See also Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2141 forbid-
ding unlicensed practice of healing arts in criminal prosecution of midwife).
16 See V. FuCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 76-78
(1974).
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professional quality. A state that believes its non-physician state employees are
incapable of making licensure decisions could hire physicians as state employees
to do the job. Instead, the power to grant and revoke the right to practice
medicine is delegated, in all states, to independent boards or licensing commit-
tees dominated by physicians. 17 These boards are assisted by state agencies,
but the ultimate power rests with board members who are not state employees
and who typically make their living practicing the profession they regulate. 18
The Supreme Court has found dominance by a profession of its own licens-
ing board not suspect unless board members can be shown to have actual per-
sonal pecuniary interests in the outcome of a decision.19 The Court also has
refused to re-examine critically the presumption of lay incompetence first
expressed in Dent, 0 even though it has shown some concern for the right to
practice one's chosen occupation, 21 and for the anticompetitive impact of pro-
fessional rules. The Court has refused to extend to the professions a blanket
exemption from the antitrust laws, "2 and in cases specifically involving the
medical profession, the Court has struck down medical society restraints on
prices and advertising. 23 Yet the Court has consistently said that medicine and
other professions are different from ordinary occupations and thus are not to
be necessarily treated the same under the antitrust laws.24
17 See H. SHUCHMAN, SELF-REGULATION IN THE PROFESSioNs 231 (1981). In 23 states,
board membership consists entirely of physicians. Id. at 229; Derbyshire, How Effec-
tive Is Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 193 (1983).
18 A board cannot be forced to act against a physician. Downing v. Fraggassi, 26
Pa. Commw. 517, 364 A.2d 748 (1976) (board's refusal to press charges against licensee
is "prosecutorial discretion" not reviewable by courts), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 910 (1978);
Berman v. Board of Registration, 355 Mass. 358, 244 N.E.2d 553 (1969) (court has no
power to direct licensing board to perform discretionary act).
1" Compare Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (board found biased due to
actual financial conflict in pending disciplinary case) with Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
1 (1979) (dominance by one faction of optometrists on board not suspect since no case
pending to show actual conflict).
20 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding statute requiring prescription from optometrist or
ophthalmologist before an optician can even fit old lenses into a new frame); Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (refusing even to examine basis for state law limiting
debt adjustment to licensed lawyers).
21 See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (invalidating civil service
rule barring noncitizens from employment in federal civil service). But see Kotch v. Board
of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (upholding harbor pilot licensing rule
that allowed nepotism by incumbent pilots to control who obtained new licenses).
22 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421, U.S. 773 (1975); National Soc'y. of Pro-
fessional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
23 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); American
Medical Ass'n v. F.T.C., 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided court,
455 U.S. 676 (1982).
24 See Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 348-49, Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
788 n.17; National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 696. Commentators have
suggested that the economic arrangements of professional practice should be subject to
[Vol. 1:77
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The distinction in antitrust cases, as well as the Court's narrowed focus on
actual pecuniary conflict of interest in other professional regulation cases, stems
directly from the second key premise behind the justification for broad profes-
sional'autonomy. The first premise - of professional expertise and concomi-
tant lay incompetence - is only half of the justification for the state's grant
of self-regulation to the profession. The second premise is that professionals
will not abuse their expertise by taking advantage of their dients. Expertise alone
could not justify independence from lay control were physicians not also able
to assert that the profession would police its members' behavior to assure that
client interests always were put first.2- Thus one finds an emphasis within the
medical profession, as in other licensed professions such as law, on the crea-
tion and enforcement of professional ethics codes. These codes presuppose the
possibility of ethical behavior, that is, that there is no inherent conflict of in-
terest in a profession regulating its own members on behalf of the state. The
Supreme Court has explicitly accepted that the medical profession's "public ser-
vice or ethical norms" may entitle it to deferential treatment by the law.26 In-
deed, it would be difficult for the Court to look beyond clear instances of in-
dividual conflicts between professionals and their clients to professional/client
conflicts inherent in the structure without challenging the entire concept of pro-
fessional licensure.
rigorous antitrust analysis while the technical content of the work should remain large-
ly in the hands of professional self-regulation. See Kissam, Antitrust Law, the First Amend-
ment, and Professional Self-Regulation of Technical Quality, in REGULATING THE PRO-
FESSIONS, A PUBLIC POLICY SYMPosIUM 143, 155 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
25 These two claims, expertise and ethicality, are central to the justification for pro-
fessional autonomy. See E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 342, 366 (1970); Becker,
The Nature of a Profession, in THE SIxTY-FIRST YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR
THE STUDY OF EDUCATION 27 (N.B. Henry ed. 1962).
26 Maricopa County Medical Socy, 457 U.S. at 348-49. See also United States v.
Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
[T]here are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship between
patient and physician is involved which are quite different than the usual con-
siderations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This Court has recogniz-
ed that forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing
to the ethical standards of a profession.
Id. at 336. See also Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
The community is concerned with the maintenance of professional standards
which will insure not only competency in individual practitioners, but protec-
tion against those who would prey upon a public peculiarly susceptible ....
And the community is concerned in providing safeguards... against practices
which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into
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B. The Expansion of Professional Authority
No clear bounds on professional authority can be found in these interwoven
justifications for professional autonomy. When the licensing system presumes
that patients are incapable of knowing their own best interests, and that physi-
cians can expertly judge and serve those interests as long as they show ethical
dedication, then decision-making is naturally ceded to the profession's pater-
nalistic judgments. Similarly, when the state believes itself incompetent to
regulate professional behavior, and so delegates the duty to the profession itself,
it becomes easier for the profession to claim a broad expertise over health issues
to which lay persons, as either parents, patients, or policy-makers, should defer.
Even if a profession must be allowed to regulate its members' conduct relative-
ly free from outside control, it does not necessarily follow that the profession
must also guide a society's health policies. However, the legal grant of autonomy
has allowed just such an expansion of professional authority to occur by set-
ting no clear bounds on professional expertise.
1. Expanded Authority Over Patients
The force of the presumption of professional authority is perhaps best
illustrated by the legal doctrine of informed consent, which ostensibly stands
as a bulwark against physician dominance over patients. Commentators often
speak of the general right of patient control of medical decision-making in ringing
and unqualified terms. 27 Closer examination shows that the ideal of informed
consent is regularly surrendered to the contradictory presumption of profes-
sional autonomy.
Surveys of physicians show an ambivalent acceptance of the need for
disclosure of at least some information about proposed treatment, 28 along with
27 The best known of these statements is Judge Cardozo's proclamation that "every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's con-
sent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (but denying recovery
of damages in case before court). See also Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350
P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960) ("Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going
self determination.").
28 A survey by Louis Harris and Associates for the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research found
that the great majority of physicians asserted they initiate discussions about the pros
and cons of treatment with patients and seldom withhold information. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS at 79, 97 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MAK-
ING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. Yet, the survey found that a similarly large majority of
physicians, 72%, consciously evaluated at least once a week how much to tell a patient.
Id. at 73. See also infra note 29.
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a marked hostility to the possibility that a patient's consent can be truly in-
formed a9 Empirical evidence suggests that the kind of full and frank discussion
between doctor and patient envisioned by the informed consent doctrine seldom
occurs. 30
Despite this evidence that patients' rights of self-determination are regularly
violated, lack of informed consent is seldom claimed in malpractice suits, 3' and
there is no recorded case of a patient winning damages solely for the dignitary
harm of not being informed about the course of treatment.3 2
This discrepancy is due in large part to the vitiation of informed consent doc-
trine in the law itself. Perhaps the most significant compromise in the doctrine
concerns who decides what risks of treatment, and alternatives to the treatment
proposed, must be disclosed to the patient. While some early cases established
a "reasonable patient" standard concerning what information a patient would
find material,3 3 the medical profession asserted that the standard of disclosure
should be set by professional custom. 34 A majority of states, reversing court
decisions by statute in some instances, now have established the professional
standard, 35 which accords little respect to disclosure. Other doctrinal limits
29 Physician writers have frequently described informed consent as a myth or fic-
tion. See, e.g., Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J. A.M.A. 1579 (1976);
Ravitch, The Myth of Informed Consent, SURGICAL RoUNDS, Feb. 1978, at 7. Their
writings typically emphasize the emotional harm to the patient from disclosure of risks
and the inability of patients to understand complex medical information. See also
Coleman, Terrified Consent, PHYSICIAN'S WORLD, May 1974, at 11; Kaplan, Greenwald
& Rogers, Neglected Aspects of Informed Consent, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1127 (1977);
Silk, A Physician's Plea: Recognize Limitations of Informed Consent, Am. Med. News,
April 12, 1976 at 19.
30 See 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 28, at 80, 84-85, 110 n.80,
111 n.81; Lidz & Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical Care, in 2 MAK-
ING HEALTH CARE DECISIONs 317, 390-406 (informed consent "largely absent from the
clinic . . ." Id. at 320.).
31 Thirty-seven states have recognized a legal right of recovery for lack of informed
consent, but in one claims study, informed consent was raised as an issue in only three
percent of the cases. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 28, at 21 n.22.
32 Id. There have been some recoveries for the dignitary harm of treatment without
any consent at all, but none for lack of informed consent. See Id. at 25 n.35.
31 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson
v. Vesey, 110 RI. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). The fact that these 1972 cases can fairly
be described as appearing early in the development of informed consent law shows how
distinctly modem informed consent is. See also Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale?
Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 169 (1977) (even when courts purport to set a
lay standard, they fail to distinguish between professional expertise needed to determine
the risks of and alternatives to treatment, and a judgment by professionals that such
information might harm patients if disclosed).
34 See MODEL INFORMED CONSENT LAW § 2 American Medical Association (1976);
A. HARVEY, R. JOHNS & R. Ross, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 61-62 (19th
ed. 1976) [hereinafter A. HARVEY].
31 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 28, at 23 n. 30 (of states that have
provisions on the subject, 26 have a professional standard and nine have patient-oriented
standard).
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discourage recovery for violation of informed consent. Many jurisdictions, for
instance, allow no recovery for the lack of informed consent itself. They re-
quire a patient to show that he suffered a specific bodily injury whose risk was
not disclosed in advance, and that if the risk had been disclosed, he would not
have undergone the treatment resulting in the injury. 36
The illusory protection the informed consent doctrine provides to patients
shows how professional autonomy, established by the licensing system, over-
whelms countervailing forces in the law. The lack of respect for patient
autonomy and the deference to professional authority, found in the implemen-
tation of a professional standard of informed consent by courts and legislatures,
are the same themes underlying the licensing system.
Compounding the dominance of physicians over patients is the hierarchical
legal structure of health care. Both individually and as a profession, physicians
control the work of other health care professionals such as nurses, physical
therapists, and social workers. These other workers are forbidden by licensing
laws and the regulations of physician-dominated medical licensing boards from
treating patients independent of physician's orders. 37 Similarly, payment by in-
surers, such as Blue Shield, is often limited to services supervised by physicians. 38
In hospitals especially, other health care professionals typically are forbidden
from providing any information to patients inconsistent with that of the pa-
tient's physician. If these workers had greater independence from physicians,
they might be able to act as a buffer between patient and doctor and to help
promote patient autonomy. As it is, they reinforce physician authority.
The connection between the legal system of professional autonomy and physi-
cian dominance over patients in decision-making is clear. The legal system em-
powers physicians and constrains patients in both direct and indirect ways.
Licensing is itself a direct constraint on patient choice. It establishes a monop-
oly that shuts out potential competitors. Not only must the sick rely on physi-
cians; in addition, when the illness is serious, a sick person must be immersed
in the self-contained environment of a hospital, which reinforces physician con-
trol and patient passivity.39 But just as important are the indirect constraints
36 See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790. Even when courts have applied a patient-
oriented standard of disclosure, the requirement that juries decide what a reasonable
patient would have wanted disclosed rather than the particular patient suing, denies
respect for the individual patient's idiosyncracies. Compare Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788
(adopting objective standard) with McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892
(1982) (adopting subjective standard; but note that North Carolina's legislature adopted
objective standard, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1981)).
37 See supra note 15.
38 Rayack, Medical Licensure: Social Costs and Social Benefits, 7 LAW & HuM. BEHAV.
147, 154 (1983).
39 Formal physician control in hospitals can be found in bylaws and other rules pro-
viding for self-governing medical staffs to decide all medical issues. Some state statutes
as well as accrediting standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
require such delegation. See Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?,
93 HARv. L. REV. 1416, 1445 nn.78-80 (1980). Informal physician control in hospitals
is found in tacit rules that forbid other health care workers from openly criticizing the
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licensing places on patients. As long as licensing is in place, so are the powerful
presumptions that legitimize it: professional competence, lay incompetence, and
professional ethicality. These presumptions have spread throughout the legal
regulation of physicians, and have assured that restraints on physicians such
as informed consent are ineffective.
2. Expanded Authority Over Social Policy
The dominance of physicians over societal decisions about health begins with
the idea of physicians regulating their own competence and spreads to the no-
tion that the profession itself should decide who gets what treatment. Part of
this dominance is perhaps no more than the reflexive habit of turning to the
putative experts in areas of uncertainty. But there is also a legally enforced
dominance that begins with dominance over individual decision-making and
eventually encompasses societal decisions.
Licensing envisions the therapeutic relationship as a bilateral contract between
physician and patient. Licensing regulates this bilateral contract not by equalizing
bargaining power, but by transforming the arms-length relationship assumed
in most contracts into a fiduciary relationship. While this has important ethical
ramifications in making decisions for individual patients, 40 the fiduciary rela-
tionship also has an important impact on societal decisions about resource alloca-
tions. When individual physicians are the agents, purchasing medical care on
behalf of their patients, the sum of their decisions equals societal expenditures
on medical care. Medical economists recognize that physicians, as both the pro-
viders and consumers of medical care, are in a unique position to set the de-
mand for their own services. 41 Generally, reform proposals have not challeng-
ed the basic fiduciary concept of physicians making decisions on behalf of their
patients. Instead they have focused on creating financial incentives, such as
health maintenance organizations, to encourage physicians to order fewer ser-
vices for their patients. 4 2
Under insurance reimbursement mechanisms, the main economic control on
a physician's medical purchases on behalf of his or her patients, aside from the
patient's pocketbook, is the set of statistical norms established by the pattern
of practice by the physician's peers. Reimbursement is based on whether the
physician's decisions fit within the range of services normally provided for
similarly situated patients. The most notable use of such standards is in the
work of physicians and that promote patient dependence in other ways. See, e.g., E.
FREIDSON, supra note 25, at 312-15 (uniformity of bureaucratic rules and restrictions on
information reduce patients' decisionmaking ability); L. LANDER, DEFECTIVE MEDICINE
20-33 (1978) (hospital environment creates dependence and passivity in patients).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 122-128.
41 See V. FucHs, supra note 16, at 96; Klarman, The Financing of Health Care, 106
DEADALUS 215, 229 (winter 1977).
42 See V. FucHs, supra note 16, at 138-41.
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Medicare program. Congress established a nationwide system of local monitor-
ing agencies controlled by the community's physicians, called Professional Stand-
ard Review Organizations." 3
Not all medical expenses are covered by insurance, so patients' ability or will-
ingness to pay still limits how much care is provided and ensures that the pro-
fession does not completely determine the demand for its services. But when
government mandates complete insurance coverage of a disease through public
funding, as with kidney disease,44 or that private insurers cover the costs of
newborn intensive care,45 it allows the medical profession to determine com-
prehensively the amount of resources society will allocate to that care.
The contractual model underlying licensure also furthers the view that health
is an individual, private problem, and that medicine can provide a complete
service that does not need integration with other health services. State provi-
sion of medical services, or, to a lesser extent, institutional licensing, would
bring physicians' work under the same administration as that of other health
care providers. This would encourage integration of medicine with other types
of care and rationalization of expenditures on physician services with other forms
of health spending. 46 Instead, the current system provides for physician
dominance over decisions about how to coordinate their services with other
forms of health care.
For example, the medical profession dominates accrediting boards for
hospitals 47 that set standards for the relationship between physician services
and those of other hospital health care workers. The medical profession's
dominance of the accrediting board for medical schools48 in turn provides con-
trol over curricular issues, such as the amount of emphasis placed on illness
prevention. The profession also sets the standards of care enforced by tort law,"5
41 Professional Standard Review Organizations (PSROs) decide whether care pro-
vided to Medicare and Medicaid patients is necessary and therefore eligible for reim-
bursement. Each PSRO is run by physicians elected by their peers in each locality or
region. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1(b)(1). See generally Public Citizen Health Research Group
v. HEW, 449 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1978) (history of PSRO legislation and summary
of provisions).
44 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
4- See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 203 n.28 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FOREGOING TREATMENT].
46 See Sedgwick, Medical Individualism, HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES, Sept. 1974, at
69, 76.
47 See H. SHUCHMAN, supra note 17, at 180-81.
48 See id.
49 In malpractice suits, the standard of care is controlled by professional custom.
See A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 59 (2d ed. 1978). Courts usually treat the
professional standard as conclusively establishing the standard of care, unlike the general
rule in negligence cases where conformity to customary practice is evidence of due care
but not conclusive. J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 49 (1977).
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and by agencies overseeing federally financed routine patient care 50 as well as
federally funded research. 51 These standards, setting acceptable levels of medical
investment in different kinds of illness, involve the balancing of patient needs
against societal resources. In addition, physicians are exempted altogether from
several significant health care regulatory programs not run by fellow physi-
cians.5 Reinforcing and reflecting the pervasive professional dominance in the
legal regulation of health care is the typical dominance of physicians on panels
advising legislatures and executive branches on health issues.
53
The presumption behind all of these facets of the medical profession's
dominance in health care is not just that physicians should collectively set the
standards for judging their own work. Rather, the presumption is also that they
are better judges than anyone else, whether nurse, patient, or policy-maker,
of what kinds of services the sick should receive.
C. Implications of Professional Dominance of Societal Decisions
The consequence of placing the medical profession in charge of many of socie-
ty's health decisions has been to institutionalize the medical model of health
and illness as the societal view. Paradoxically, this medical model derives much
But see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (liability imposed even
though physician behavior conformed to professional practice). Helling has not been
followed in other jurisdictions. A. HOLDER, supra, at 54.
50 See supra note 43.
51 Regulations governing Institutional Review Boards, which approve federally fund-
ed research in hospitals, provide for diverse board membership but permit as much as
a four-to-one majority of physicians on a hospital's board. 45 C.F.R. § 46.106 (1982).
52 The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act requires manufacturers to prove a drug's safe-
ty and efficacy for any purpose for which the drug is advertised. P.L. 87-781, 76 STAT.
781, § 102(C) (as amended by 21 U.S.C. 355(d) (1962). Physicians are not obligated to
prescribe a drug solely for approved uses; rather they are limited only by professional
custom. See J. GIBSON, MEDICATION LAW AND BEHAVIOR 319 (1976) (quoting testimony
of FDA general counsel to Congressional committee).
The National Health Planning and Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300k (1976),
established a national network of Health Systems Agencies (HSA) to plan development
of medical resources with a goal of preventing unnecessary duplication. Hospitals must
win approval from an HSA before making substantial capital outlays. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-6
(supp. IV 1980). But individual physicians are exempt from the act. 42 U.S.C. §
300m-6(e)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 100.102 (1982). But see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
(holding state computer compilation of names of patients receiving prescriptions for fre-
quently abused drugs does not invade protected doctor/patient privacy).
53 The most recent example was the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 7 of whose 11 members
at the time it disbanded in 1983 were physicians. See FOREGOING TREATMENT, supra note
45, at ii. One particularly influential body was the Harvard Medical School's commit-
tee that proposed statutory changes in the definition of death that have been adopted
by a number of states. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to ex-
amine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A.
337 (1968); Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29
U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 386, 386 & n.2 (1981).
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of its influence from its putative objectivity. Yet the medical profession is so
thoroughly entrenched as the official view, that it can no longer remain objec-
tively self-critical about its theories of disease and illness, but has become
obligated to defend those theories or lose power. What began as science becomes
ideology, 54 no longer simply a theoretical approach to understanding disease
but a culturally dominant way of understanding the human experience of ill-
ness."5
That medical view is rooted in a theory of disease and illness that powerfully
affects the way that physicians perceive patients. 56 Not surprisingly, this theory
focuses on biological abnormalities within individuals and relegates the com-
plex societal aspects of illness to the periphery of its vision . 5' Treating ill per-
sons becomes transformed into treating the diseases located in their bodies.58
Scientific treatment is judged to be that which works without regard to the non-
objective factors of illness such as a patient's societal and psychological situa-
tion. Under this medical model, it is no coincidence that patients become
54 While a science is disinterested in the reality it describes, ideology is committed.
See C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 231 (1973). Ideologies provide "maps
of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience." Id.
at 220.
55 See, e.g., E. FREIDSON, supra note 25, at 330-31 (autonomy gives profession power
to define and organize need for its own services). For the significance of medicine as
ideology, see the discussion of radical critics, infra note 125; E. HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR
WORK 79 (1958) (medical profession "tries to define for all of us the very nature of health
and disease"); Engel, The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine,
196 SCIENCE 129, 130 (1977) (medical approach has expanded beyond research role into
cultural role as "folk model" explaining illness).
56 This influence on perception is profound. Perception simultaneously embraces
visual sensation and knowledge. Two people with different theories who look upon the
same object do not see the same thing. See C. GEERTZ, supra note 54, at 214-18 (all percep-
tion is theory-laden); N. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CON-
CEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 4-30 (1961).
57 This theory arose in the early nineteenth century with the development of
pathological anatomy. This development transformed the concept of illness into one
measurable by anatomic or biochemical abnormalities, and not dependent on a patient's
subjective symptoms. See M. FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC, AN ARCHAEOLOGY
OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION 3, 35, 97 & passim (1973). Today, physicians still have no
systematic vocabulary for describing what for patients is the essence of illness - the
interaction of a human being with a disease. Thus, it is not surprising that physicians,
especially in hospitals, ignore patients and focus on disease. See A. FEINSTEIN, CLINICAL
JUDGMENT 72-79, 84-88, 118, 126, 364 (1967).
See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 37 (2d ed. 1970)
(system of theory, or paradigm, which dominates a science at any point in history can
insulate a scientific community from socially important problems for which paradigm
has no tools).
58 This has far-reaching consequences in infant care. For example, physicians sup-
port the regionalization of neonatal intensive care units because they reduce infant death
and disease. Little attention is given to the difficulties such systems create for parents
who live long distances from the hospitals where their infants are placed, and the subse-
quent child abandonment and other psychological attachment problems that develop.
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depersonalized 9 or that patient autonomy is regularly violated, because per-
sonal characteristics and patient choice are not viewed as significant aspects
of causing or curing illness. This medical theory of illness remains dominant
despite the inability of its proponents to demonstrate its superiority in healing.6
0
Yet the legal grant of autonomy to physicians - and the medical profession's
subsequent dominance of the health care system - have discouraged the
development of non-medical understandings of health and illness.61 These
Compare Swyer, The Organization of Perinatal Care with Particular Reference to the
Newborn, in NEONATOLOGY, PATHOPHYSIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NEWBORN 17,
25-30 (G. Avery 2d ed. 1981) (measures "improved outcome" in newborn care through
regional centers only in terms of effects on morbidity and mortality rates) with Jones,
Environmental Analysis of Neonatal Intensive Care, 170 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIsEAsE
130 (1982) (amount of time parents spend with newborns in intensive care varies in-
versely with distance between home and hospital; at over 50 miles distance is associated
with infants becoming wards of the state).
19 See Frader, Difficulties in Providing Intensive Care, 64 PEDIATRICS 10, 14 (1979)
(emphasis on technology and "physiological detail" in pediatric intensive care unit deper-
sonalizes both patients and staff and contributes to haphazardness of discussion of moral
issues); A. FEINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 364 (physicians refer to patients as either diseases
or surgical procedures).
The depersonalizing aspects of hospitals are not simply a function of the hospital
as a bureaucracy but of the medical profession's effort to isolate the biological causes
of illness from the social and psychological factors and to limit treatment primarily to
the biological. See supra note 57.
60 See T. McKEOWN, THE MODERN RISE OF POPULATION 91-109, 152-63 (1976) (most
improvement in life expectancy due to sanitation, nutrition, other non-medical social
changes); R. DvBos, MIRAGE OF HEALTH 163, 212-19 (1958) (similar); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
(1978) (ten of seventeen drug and surgical therapies and diagnostic procedures review-
ed, including intensive care after heart attacks and fetal monitoring during childbirth,
show no benefit in survival or improved health despite high costs); A. COCHRANE, EFFI-
CIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS (1972) (similar review of variety of medical procedures); A.
FEINSTEIN, supra note 57, at 40-41, 53 (even studies purporting to show efficacy "usual-
ly are not scientifically reproducible" and thus are of little worth in determining merit
of treatment).
Some commentators argue that the inefficacy of modern medicine is precisely due
to this depersonalization. See Id. at 365 (inattention to patients as persons has led to
failure to classify systematically manifestations of illness in patients so that results of
therapy can can judged scientifically).
61 Within medicine, there has been some attempt to accommodate more "holistic"
understandings of illness. Commentators argue that this represents not enlightenment
but an attempt to extend medical dominance even further beyond the bounds of technical
expertise into social and psychological areas for which physicians are little trained. See
Veatch, The Hippocratic Ethic: Consequentialism, Individualisr, and Paternalism in
No RUSH To JUDGMENT - ESSAYS ON MEDICAL ETHICS 238, 250 (D. Smith & L. Bernstein
eds. 1978). See also H. FABREGA, DISEASE AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 218-19 (1974) (a truly
unified view of illness as a confluence of biological, social and emotional factors would
require a virtual revolution in the training of physicians.); Zola, Medicine as an Institu-
tion of Social Control, in THE CULTURAL CRISIS OF MODERN MEDICINE 87-88 (J. Ehrenreich
ed. 1978).
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understandings could contain the over-extension of medical authority by of-
fering alternatives to the hegemony of the medical care system. 62
Examples of such competing alternatives that currently are subsumed to physi-
cian authority, and consequently are ill-funded and of low prestige, include
public health, social work and nursing. Each of these fields has perspectives
on illness and expertise different from physicians: public health in its focus on
resource allocation and environmental interventions, 63 nursing in its whole-
person focus on patients, 64 and social work in its attention to family and com-
munity support in mitigating the consequences of illness. 65
III. DECISION-MAKING FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS
The issue of withholding treatment from handicapped infants provides a strik-
ing illustration of the consequences of the dominance of the medical profession
over health care. Many of those troubled by the current way in which great
discretion is vested in doctors and parents share an intuitive belief that this is
an area where physicians lack exclusive expertise in making decisions. Yet sur-
prisingly little attention has been given to what actually goes on in the deci-
sions reached between doctors and parents, or to the relationship between those
decisions and societal decisions. It is useful to explore these neglected areas of
the issue to try to better understand both the phenomenon of handicapped in-
fants and the effects of the legal structure of health care in a specific case.
A. The Focus of the Controversy
Nearly all of the controversy about care for infants with birth defects has
centered on what happens in individual cases in the hours and days following
birth.66 Societal consensus exists only at the extremes: life-sustaining care should
62 See E. FREIDSON, supra note 25, at 369-70 (professional autonomy creates a "splen-
did isolation" in which very fact of autonomy encourages physicians to inflate the ob-
jectivity and importance of their work and to become unwilling to listen to outsiders).
63 For example, public health long has emphasized non-medical interventions to pre-
vent illness in pregnant women and infants. See M. GRANT, HANDBOOK OF COMMUNITY
HEALTH 137-60, 165-66 (3d ed. 1981); J. HANLON, PUBLIC HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND
PRACTICE 320-34 (6th ed. 1974).
64 See infra note 83.
65 Social work, historically influenced by the individual-oriented medical model,
has suffered from a similar narrow focus on treating individuals at the expense of at-
tacking the social causes of clients' problems. See M. ADAMS, MENTAL RETARDATION AND
ITS SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 59 (1971). However, the profession's focus has begun to shift
to a more balanced approach between individual casework and activities such as cum-
munity organization of parents' groups and lobbying legislatures for public funding of
services. See id. at 248-85.
66 The incidence of cases requiring such decisions is common. See FOREGOING TREAT-
MENT, supra note 45, at 207 (such decisions "are part of everyday life" in newborn in-
tensive care units); Campbell, Which Infants Should Not Receive Intensive Care?, 57
ARCH. DISEASE CHILDHOOD 569 (1982) (based on one intensive care nursery, estimates
20.5% of newborn deaths are from withholding treatment); Duff & Campbell, Moral
and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973)
(43 of 299 deaths in special care nursery followed decisions not to treat).
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be given to infants with minor defects such as cleft palate; care may be withheld
from infants whose defects are so severe that care would only prolong dying.67
Controversy centers mainly on a broad middle category of infants with severe
mental and physical handicaps, such as Down's syndrome and spina bifida. 68
67 See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 91-96 (1979) (advocates of broad parental autonomy would intervene when
non-treatment would deny child "relatively normal healthy growth," as when blood
transfusion refused for otherwise normal child); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE
214 (1978) (critic of present physician/parent autonomy would make exception to duty
to treat when infant "born dying" or otherwise beyond medical help).
68 See Shaw, Randolph & Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National
Survey of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588, 590 (1977) (pediatri-
cians nearly unanimous in favoring non-treatment for anencephaly and for Trisomy 13-15
but split almost evenly on spina bifida and Down's syndrome).
While there are a variety of birth anomalies for which treatment has been withheld,
most attention centers on the following conditions:
(1) Down's Syndrome. Down's is a chromosomal abnormality that occurs about
once in every 600 births. H. JOLLY, DISEASES OF CHILDREN 195 (4th ed. 1981). It is associated
with varying degrees of mental retardation and often is accompanied by heart defects
and blockages in the intestine or esophagus. These blockages prevent normal digestion
of food but are correctable by simple surgery. FOREGOING TREATMENT, supra note 45,
at 202-03 & n.26.
(2) Spina bifida, or meningomyelocele. This occurs about once in every 500 births
when the fetus's developing spine fails to seal properly and the infant is born with part
of the spinal cord protruding from its back. This causes nerve damage, including total
or partial paralysis of the legs and loss of bowel and bladder control. Id. at 202. Surgery
is required to close the spinal opening to prevent fatal infection and, in some cases, to
shunt excess spinal fluid from the brain. H. JOLLY, supra, at 191-93.
(3) Low birth weight infants. These infants usually are given maximal treatment.
See Strong, The Tiniest Newborns, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1983, at 14. Some pro-
minent physicians have argued for withholding treatment in selected cases. See Kirkley,
Fetal Survival - What Price, 137 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 873 (1980) (as
prematurity is leading cause of mental retardation, aggressive treatment of low birth
weight babies without selection must be reassessed with view towards fact that much
suffering has resulted in spite of massive effort of dedicated support teams; fact of sur-
vival not so much a tribute to medical achievement as misuse of medical power). Low-
weight infants often become normal but occasionally suffer permanent brain damage
that cannot be predicted at birth. See Strong, supra, at 16.
(4) Infants born with little or no brain, or anencephaly. These infants usually die
within a few hours or days of birth no matter what care is given. FOREGOING TREAT-
MENT, supra note 45, at 202.
(5) Infants who suffer brain damage at birth due to lack of oxygen. These infants
usually are treated aggressively at first, but decisions sometimes are made later not to
resuscitate infants who stop breathing or to withhold other care. See D. CRANE, THE
SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS 74-83 (1975).
Predicting the extent of handicaps is often impossible in the early period after birth.
H. JOLLY, supra, at 92.
(6) Infants with other anomalies. Less common birth defects include Trisomy 13
and Trisomy 18, most of whose victims die in a few weeks. Id. at 198.
This list can be divided into three categories: (1) infants who can receive no benefit
from medical treatment because the severity of their condition dooms them to an early
death, e.g., anencephaly, Trisomy 13 and Trisomy 18; (2) infants who clearly can benefit
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Some commentators and parents maintain that such children are capable of hap-
py, meaningful lives,69 and so should be given comprehensive treatment. Others
argue that in the absence of societal consensus about whether such lives are
worth living, parents and physicians should decide on a case-by-case basis
whether such infants live.70
Parents and physicians have this broad discretion to decide whether and how
vigorously infants with severe handicaps are to be treated. Occasionally,
hospitals ask courts to authorize treatment when parents oppose it, 71 but this
is unusual because the prospect of litigation is enough to persuade most parents
from medical treatment because it will extend their lives and allow them to experience
an arguably "meaningful" life despite the certainty of handicaps, e.g., Down's syndrome
and spina bifida; (3) infants for whom the benefits of medical treatment are uncertain
because of the impossibility of predicting at the time of treatment decisions whether they
will survive and with what handicaps, e.g., low birth weight and birth trauma.
69 See, e.g., Dorner, Adolescents with Spina Bifida: How They See Their Situation,
51 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 439 (1976) (emotional adjustment not greatly different
from normal adolescents); Brown & McLone, Treatment Choices for the Infant with
Meningomyelocele, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 69 (D. Horan & M.
Delahoyde eds. 1982) (motor function improves following early surgical treatment of
spina bifida; nearly impossible to predict at birth future intellectual ability); Foot, supra
note 3, at 109 (Down's children "are able to live on for quite a time in a reasonably
contented way, remaining like children all their lives but capable of affectionate rela-
tionships and able to play games and perform simple tasks."). For comments by parents
describing the benefits of raising a handicapped child, see, e.g., R. DARLING, FAMILIES
AGAINST SOCIETY, A STUDY OF REACTIONS TO CHILDREN WITH BIRTH DEFECTS 185-87 (1979)
(parents interviewed in study would not deliberately choose to have handicapped child
but feel experience valuable to them); Fein, We Couldn't Give Up on Jason, FAMILY CIR-
CLE Oct. 26, 1982, at 40 (parents of Down's child); Schalck, A Parent's Experience with
a Child with Spina Bifida, in DECISION MAKING AND THE DEFECTIVE NEWBORN 158 (C.
Swinyard ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Swinyard].
70 See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 67, at 91-98 (parental
autonomy should govern when no societal consensus that child's life is "worth living");
Duff & Campbell, supra note 66, (parents and physicians should decide because most
familiar with circumstances of each case); Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical
Viewpoint, 4 AM. J. LAw & MED. 233 (1978) (only check needed is on accuracy of medical
diagnosis by a physician's peers).
This is the official position of the American Medical Association. See OPINIONS OF
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, § 2.10 (1982) ("[iln
desperate situations involving newborns, the advice and judgment of the physician should
be readily available, but the decision whether to exert maximal efforts to sustain life
should be the choice of the parents.").
71 See, e.g., In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct. App. 12, 1982) ("In-
fant Doe" case that prompted Reagan regulations; hospital sought court decision after
doctors disagreed on whether to treat Down's infant); Application of Cicero, 101 Misc.
2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (court appoints guardian to consent to surgery
for spina bifida infant); Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct.
1974) reprinted in R. WEIR, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH & DYING (1977) (court orders treat-
ment for infant with multiple defects); N.Y. Times, June 24, 1981, at A14, col. 6 (Miami
judge orders treatment for infant with spinal defect).
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to give in.72 When doctors and parents agree on nontreatment, the state rarely
intervenes, either to impose treatment or to prosecute criminally.
73
Opponents of current practice maintain that physicians and parents have too
much discretion. They argue that decisions can violate the best interests of
helpless infants. 74 At one extreme, parents, encouraged by physicians, may focus
on their own interests in avoiding the burdens of life with a handicapped child. 75
72 See Duff, Counseling Families and Deciding Care of Severely Defective Children:
A Way of Coping with 'Medical Vietnam', 67 PEDIATRICS 315-16 (1981) (The threat of
internal guilt and of public notoriety resulting from court action brings most parents
into line).
73 The Reagan administration's attempt to intervene in the case of Baby Jane Doe
in New York is a notable exception to the usual hands-off approach of government of-
ficials to treatment decisions. See United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying federal right to intervene
where parents have made reasonable decision against surgery for handicapped child).
Only one criminal prosecution has been reported in this country. See Robertson,
Dilemma in Danville, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1981 at 5 (judge dismisses charges
against couple for lack of evidence that non-treatment of Siamese twins was at parents'
request). A British physician was acquitted of a charge of attempted murder involving
the death of-a Down's infant. See THE LANCET, Nov. 14, 1981 at 1101. See also Robert-
son, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV.
213, 243 (1975) (describing a number of theories under which criminal prosecution could
be brought but noting that rarity of prosecutions amounts to delegation of prosecutorial
authority to physican/parent decision-making).
74 A child has an interest in any treatment that will extend its life unless for the
infant's own sake it is better to be dead than alive. This must be determined from the
vantage point of the handicapped individual. To a person of normal intelligence, life
with an IQ of 50 might not be worth living, but to a person who has never experienced
normal intelligence, such a life might be preferable to death. See Foot, supra note 3,
at 94 ("[oln any view of the goods and evils that life can contain, it seems that a life
with more evil than good could still itself be a good.")
Courts almost unanimously have sustained the view that life with even severe han-
dicaps is better than no life at all, refusing to recognize a "wrongful life" cause of action
for such children. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980)
(A child with Down's Syndrome has no cause of action against doctor for failing to ad-
vise a genetic test that could have led to abortion); Berman v. Allan & Attardi, 80 N.J.
421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979) (Pashman, J.) (for the court to say that a child with
Down's Syndrome would be better off never existing ". . . would require us to disavow
the basic assumption upon which our society is based ..." namely, sanctity of life.
But see Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (Tay-Sachs victim given right to recover against genetic testing
laboratory). The California Supreme Court overruled Curlender in Turpin v. Sortini,
31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982), holding that while it could
not agree with other courts that as a matter of law the value of impaired life always
exceeded the value of nonlife, it was impossible to determine in any given case "...
whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury by being born with an ailment as
opposed to not being born at all ...." 643 P.2d at 963.
71 See, e.g., Fost, Counseling Families Who Have a Child with a Severe Congenital
Anomaly, 67 PEDIATRICS 321, 323 (1981); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defec-
tive Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 255-59 (1975).
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At the other extreme, parents or physicians may insist on all-out treatment that
provides no benefit for the infant. Defenders of the present system respond that
physicians can make sure that parents' choices are based on accurate facts and
are ethically reasonable.76
Both sides in this debate have cast the issue largely in terms of whether physi-
cians and parents acting together have too much discretion. Neither has ade-
quately focused on what happens between physicians and parents, 77 or the
societal resource allocation problems that create the framework for the deci-
sions in individual cases. 78 Physicians actually are much more dominant in mak-
ing decisions about infants than either defenders or critics of the current system
acknowledge, and the medical model of illness exerts a profound if subtle effect
on the very shaping of the terms of debate.
B. Physician Dominance of Parents
The control of information is the key means by which physicians dominate
parents in decision-making. As a rule, the physician in charge of an infant's
care decides who talks to the parents - the doctor himself, or more often, nurses
and social workers - and what is said. 7 9 The emphasis is on presenting to
parents a "united front" of medical advice. Nurses, social workers, and other
76 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 66, at 571 ("[als pediatricians we have a major
responsibility to ensure that the process of decision-making will stand up to the most
rigorous scrutiny"); Duff & Campbell, On Deciding the Care of Severely Handicapped
or Dying Persons: With Particular Reference to Infants, 57 PEDIATRICS 487, 491 (1976)
(physicians "set limits").
77 Thus, commentators frequently assume without evidence that parents are the
primary decision-makers. See, e.g., Note, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard for Non-
treatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REv. 599, 602 n.15 (1978) (explicitly states parents make
decisions); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 67, at 91-98 (implicitly
assumes parents are main decision-makers since authors see threat to parental autonomy
coming not from physicians but from courts). See also OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUN-
CIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, § 2.10 (1982) (relying on assertion that
parents should be primary decision-makers to support view that current practice should
not be interfered with).
78 Discussions that try to put these individual decisions into the broader context
of societal decisions are rare. See, e.g., E. KEYSERLINGK, SANCTITY OF LIFE OR QUALITY
OF LIFE IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHICS, MEDICINE AND LAw 173-77 (1979); Smith, On Letting
Some Babies Die, in KILLING AND LETrING DIE 95 (B. Steinbock ed. 1980).
71 See Duff, Guidelines for Deciding Care of Critically Ill or Dying Patients, 64
PEDIATRICS 17, 21-22 (1979) (hospital policy provides that physician in charge of child's
care decides whether staff disagreements about treatment are communicated to family);
Bogdan, Brown & Foster, Be Honest but Not Cruel: Staff/Parent Communication On
A Neonatal Unit, 41 HUMAN ORG. 6, 11 (1982) (study of neonatal unit finds doctors
are in charge of communication with parents, and "[niurses and social workers may
discuss the child's larger diagnostic and prognostic picture but only in an attempt to
clarify what physicians have already told the parents.")
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non-physicians who disagree with the decision of the primary physician are ex-
pected to keep their disagreements to themselves, and those who speak out risk
disciplinary, action.80
These other professionals have their own distinctive professional expertise
and points of view toward handicapped infants. For example, nurses are the
primary care-givers in intensive care nurseries, both in technical procedures8
and in non-medical nurturing care. 82 Their professional ethic stresses recogniz-
ing the human qualities in handicapped infants and maintaining the dignity of
patients as persons. 8 3 Social workers have two main roles in intensive care
nurseries: as intermediaries in reducing physician/nurse conflicts 84 and as family
10 See Statement of C. Everett Koop before the Senate Subcomm. on Family and
Human Services, April 6, 1983 at 8 (surgeon general reports receiving more than 20 con-
tacts from nurses threatened with discipline for objecting to orders from doctors to deny
food to handicapped newborns). See generally J. MUYSKENS, MORAL PROBLEMS IN NURS-
ING 48-49 (1982) (most nurses risk challenging physician orders only in extreme cases).
81 See Harper, Little & Sia, The Scope of Nursing Practice in Level Ill Neonatal In-
tensive Care Units, 70 PEDIATRICS 875, 877 (1982) (nurses, especially those with advanc-
ed training, perform duties identical to junior physicians and even train physicians in
procedures historically in physicians' province).
82 See Jones, supra note 58, at 137 (79.1% of all adult contact with infants in inten-
sive care nursery provided by nurses, most consisting of soothing, rocking, etc.).
83 See American Nurses' Association Code for Nurses, reprinted in J. MUYSKENS,
supra note 80, at 7 (ethical code emphasizes nurses' respect for "human dignity and the
uniqueness of the client"); Id. at 36-40 (nurse "caring" functions aim at maintaining
autonomy of patient). The "care" orientation of nurses distinguishes their work as be-
ing more than mere technical assistance to physicians. Beyond their work with the
newborns themselves, nurses are heavily involved, with social workers, in helping the
family adjust to their sick newborn. This includes both teaching practical home care
when the infant is discharged, and showing the family the infant's worth as a person.
See Brown & Bernstein, Family-Centered Nursing Care, in NEONATOLOGY, supra note
58, at 78, 82-84. See also Allen, Normalization and the Child with Developmental Delays,
in Swinyard, supra note 69, at 333 (example of nurses establishing regional treatment
program for handicapped children combining vocational, educational, family, and other
non-medical services aimed at allowing handicapped to live in community rather than
in institutions).
See generally M. MUNDINGER, AUTONOMY IN NURSING 63-105 & passim. (1980) sum-
marizes nurses' efforts to maintain autonomy in variety of settings including indepen-
dent nurse practitioner offices, public health nurses and hospitals, describes a "primary
nursing" model of hospital care in which single nurse responsible for patient's nursing
care parallels responsibility of primary physician for medical care).
84 See Kornblum & Marshall, A Clinical Social Worker's Function as Consultant
in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, 7 SOCIAL WORK HEALTH CARE 57 (1981) (liaison
function mitigates physician dominance by sensitizing physicians concerned with nurse
"burnout" to stresses experienced by nurses' lack of decisional authority). But see
Thomstadt, A Nurse Comments, 7 SOCIAL WORK HEALTH CARE 64 (1981) (structural
change of health care system better approach to nurse job stress than individual
counseling).
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therapists helping in the adjustment to a handicapped newborn.85
Physicians not only control the information presented to parents but control
aspects of the work of other health care workers. This reinforces physician
dominance over parents, by reminding them who is in charge in the hospital
authority structure. In addition, physician dominance means that other health
care professionals have less of an opportunity to influence decisions. 8 6
Moreover, the physician in charge of a case enjoys great independence even
from his peers,8 7 due in large part to a professional notion of disease that stresses
the superiority of bedside observation over textbook knowledge. The
technological sophistication and emotional stress in an intensive care nursery,
and the need for close teamwork in such an environment, encourage physicians
and other health care workers to ignore moral disputes and focus instead on
physiological detail. 88
In this setting, parents play a largely passive role, receiving the information
which supports the physicians' recommendations, and then giving their con-
sent. 89 While parents can influence what a doctor recommends depending on
Nurses generally identify conflicts with physicians - especially young physicians
with similar skills as nurses but more authority - as a main source of stress in working
in newborn intensive care. In contrast, physicians are not generally stressed by conflicts
with nurses. See Astbury & Yu, Determinants of Stress for Staff in a Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit, 57 ARCHIVEs DISEASE CHILDHOOD 108, 109 (1982). This stress in decisional
authority helps explain why nurses have a much higher "burnout" rate in intensive care
nurseries than physicians. See id. at 111.
85 See Siegel, A Family-Centered Program of Neonatal Intensive Care, 7 HEALTH
& Soc. WoRK 50, 53-54 (1982) (duties include assessing family's social and psychological
adjustment to newborn, counseling family members, providing referrals to community
agencies for follow-up care, financial assistance, etc.).
86 Physicians sometimes emphasize that other professionals, particularly nurses,
should be consulted; the motivation, however, is usually more to appease other health
care workers than because their point of view is genuinely valued. See, e.g., Avery,
The Morality of Drastic Intervention, in NEONATOLOGY, supra note 58, at 15 (physicians
"must be careful to share the reasons for their decisions" with nurses); Duff, supra note
79, at 22 (nurses are better able to carry out duties if they understand reasons for treat-
ment decisions).
87 Fewer than one percent of hospitals have established ethics committees for such
cases, and many of those provide only general guidelines, not review of specific deci-
sions by physicians and parents. FOREGOING TREATMENT, supra note 45, at 161-64. See
generally M. MILLMAN, THE UNKINDEST CuT 136 (1976) (physicians disagreeing with deci-
sion of primary doctor usually are "expressly forbidden" to tell family); J. BERLANT, PRO-
FESSION AND MONOPOLY 71-73 (1975) (long tradition in medical ethics of not telling pa-
tients about conflicting medical opinions).
88 See Frader, supra note 59, at 14 (dominance of technology and efforts to control
emotions by burying feelings lead to depersonalization of both infant patients and staff).
89 See Bogdan, Brown & Foster, supra note 79, at 10, 12-13 (parents' role is to receive
information that is usually colored optimistically so parents are seldom aware of in-
fant's true condition); Avery, supra note 86, at 13, 15 ("ultimately, the family has the
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whether physicians perceive the parents as positive or negative toward the in-
fant, 90 they are seldom active decision-makers in a meaningful way. 91
Indeed, consistent with the medical profession's long-standing paternalism
toward its clientele, 92 many physicians regard parents, because of emotional
shock and technical ignorance, as incompetent to make decisions. 93 It is un-
questionable that parents suffer an initial period of emotional trauma, with vary-
ing amounts of denial, anger, rejection of the ill baby, grief and numbness, all
mixed together in complex stages. But empirical evidence does not support the
view that parents' emotional or intellectual handicaps prevent them from par-
ticipating in decisions. 94 In fact, studies show that medical personnel frequent-
ly misjudge parental reactions to the infant as well as parental understanding
of the medical issues. This is mainly due to the little time or attention given
authority to accept or reject the recommendation of the physician, but it is unfair to
place the whole burden of decision on them.")
90 See, e.g., Shaw, Randolph & Manard, supra note 68, at 591-92 (minority of physi-
cians would leave entirely to parents decision of whether to repair surgically intestinal
obstruction in Down's infant); D. CRANE, supra note 68, at 50-51, 83 (survey of pediatri-
cians, pediatric heart surgeons and neurosurgeons found parental desires had only
marginal influence on physician treatment decisions); Todres, Krane, Howell & Shan-
non, Pediatricians' Attitudes Affecting Decision-Making in Defective Newborns, 60
PEDIATRICS 197, 198 (1977) (parental desire to withhold spina bifida surgery would be
honored by 60% of pediatricians).
91 This conclusion is supported by surveys of physicians, see supra note 90, as well
as by studies of neonatal units, physician comments, and articles by parents who have
been through the experience. For studies, see, e.g., D. CRANE, supra note 66, at 98-99
(hospital records review study showing heart surgeons unlikely to operate on Down's
infants even if parents favor surgery and despite hospital policy favoring equal treat-
ment for Down's and non-Down's infant heart patients); Bodgan, Brown, & Foster, supra
note 79. For physicians' comments, see, e.g., Campbell, supra note 66, at 570 (decisions
should be made by doctor); Fost, How Decisions Are Made: A Physician's View, in
Swinyard, supra note 67, at 228 ("the parents I see are at the mercy of the physician's
presentation, and their 'consent' is rarely informed or uncoerced in any meaningful sense.")
For articles by parents, see infra note 96.
92 See Szasz & Hollender, The Basic Models of the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
97 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 585, 586-87 (1956) (doctor guides and patient is expected
to cooperate); Relman, supra note 70, at 237 (according to prominent physician essence
of doctor-patient relationship is patient trusting in physician's decisions).
91 See, e.g., Fost, supra note 73, at 322 (parents unable to assimilate facts during
initial shock after birth); Relman, A Response to Allen Buchanan's Views on Decision
Making for Terminally Ill Incompetents, 5 Am. J. LAw & MED. 119, 120 (1979) (families
often too grief-stricken or too ambivalent to decide).
94 See Benfield, Leib & Vollman, Grief Responses of Parents to Neonatal Death and
Parent Participation in Deciding Care, 62 PEDIATRICS 171 (1978); 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS, supra note 28, at 55-111 (1982) (discussing capacity of patients to participate
in decisions).
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in intensive care nurseries to dealing with parents. 9 Furthermore, parents of
handicapped infants, interviewed about their hospital experiences, frequently
stress their anger and frustration at their inability to get information and the
attempts made to manipulate their decisions.96
Medical decision-making thus can be characterized not as a painful but col-
legial process of shared decisions among equals but as an authoritarian, pater-
nalistic process. This increases the risk of decisions that are arbitrary and in-
consistent simply through the lack of a thorough airing of factual and moral
issues. 97
These flaws in medical decision-making can be traced to the complex interplay
between the medical model of illness and the legal structure of medical practice
reinforcing that model. While the medical model acknowledges that factors such
as lifestyle and environment can play a role in illness, it insists that the true
causes and cures of illness lie in physiological factors within medicine's exclusive
expertise. Under this model, there is little practical need for communication with
parents; consent is regarded as a legalistic encumbrance of no benefit to the
therapeutic process. The legal structure of medical practice establishes the
medical model as the correct and normal way of viewing health and illness,
and it establishes deference to professional judgment as the social norm. But
it does more than create norms that emasculate protest. The legal monopoly
granted to the medical profession directly constrains parents from obtaining
expert help that is not controlled by physicians. The licensing system forces
parents into an intimate yet subservient relationship with a physician. It en-
shrines this relationship as presumptively private and not to be invaded by out-
siders. Even those with special expertise about handicapped infants are exclud-
ed except at the direction of the physician. Parents have little choice but to bend
to the will of professional judgment.
C. The Medical Model and Resource Allocations
Despite the fact that the literature on handicapped newborns is overwhelm-
ingly concerned with the individual decisions analyzed above, it should be clear
that the issue is much broader. A series of societal decisions creates the matrix
within which individual physicians and parents struggle with their consciences.
95 See Bogdan, Brown & Foster, supra note 79, at 11 (staff tried to adjust informa-
tion to parents' intelligence and attitude but often misjudged due to spending so little
time with parents); Jones, supra note 58, at 136 (staff consistently misjudged degree of
parental attachment to infants).
96 See R. DARLING, supra note 69, at 128-44, 151-54; Bridge & Bridge, The grief
Life and Death of Christopher Bridge, HASTINGS CENTER REP. Dec. 1981, at 17; Stinson
& Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1979, at 64 (parents unable
to stop doctors from treating terminally ill newborn son).
97 One physician prominent in the treatment of spina bifida, Dr. David McLone,
testified at a Congressional hearing that the single most common reason for denial of
care was ignorance about modern improvements in treatment outcomes for such infants.
See S. Rep. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2927.
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Perhaps most obviously connected are the societal decisions about the quali-
ty of educational and rehabilitative resources that will be made available to
handicapped children. The decision-makers' perception of the quality of these
resources will directly affect whether they choose to try to save the child's life. 98
But resource allocations do not merely affect decisions to treat or not to treat.
To a large extent, resource allocations determine the existence and severity of
the problem of handicapped infants. The number of handicapped children born
is not a natural constant, but depends on broad social choices of how wealth
is distributed and how services like pre-natal medical care are provided. 9 The
mothers of low birth-weight infants are likely to be poor, nonwhite, single, poor-
ly educated and lacking adequate health care during pregnancy. 100 Moreover,
the very possibility of treatment choices for such children was created by deci-
sions to invest in high-technology intensive care for newborns.10'
These resource allocation decisions show a marked skewing toward invest-
ment in medical technology. Less attention is given to non-medical means of
ameliorating handicaps. Hospital care for newborn handicapped infants is widely
98 When discussed explicitly, post-hospital care available for handicapped children
is often referred to by commentators in sweepingly bleak terms. See, e.g., Duff, Counsel-
ing Families and Deciding Care of Severely Defective Children: A Way of Coping with
'Medical Vietnam', 67 PEDLATRIcS 315, 316 (1981) ("even in better institutions where severe-
ly defective human beings are 'warehoused,' conditions are... unavoidably detrimen-
tal to any child's interests ... ") Cf. D. MACMILLAN, MENTAL RETARDATION IN SCHOOL
AND SOCIETY 542 (2d ed. 1982) (only about 10% of the retarded live in institutions of
any kind).
91 Great discrepancies exist between the health of people in different social classes,
particularly infants. Poor children are 13 times more likely to be mentally retarded than
children from middle- and upper-class families. R. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL
RETARDATION 21-22, 39 (1973). Infant death is 50% higher among black Americans than
whites, and prematurity and congenital malformations - the focus of most nontreat-
ment decisions in intensive care nurseries - are the two leading causes of infant death.
M. GRANT, HANDBOOK OF COMMUNITY HEALTH 147 (3d ed. 1981). Studies have found
that these class differences are not the result of unavoidable natural genetic variations
but stem from inadequacies in pre-natal medical care, nutrition and the like. See, e.g.,
Naeye, Causes of Fetal and Neonatal Mortality by Race in a Selected U.S. Population,
69 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 857, 860 (1979) (initial data showed black perinatal mortality
rate to be 50.5 per 1,000 versus 34.4 per 1,000 for whites; the difference disappeared
when only patients who began prenatal care during the first trimester of pregnancy were
included in the statistical analysis). See also R. CONLEY, supra, at 323 (prevalence of
moderate and severe retardation would drop by almost 80% if all classes had same in-
cidence of retardation as upper- and middle-class whites).
100 See Eisner, Brazie, Pratt & Hexter, The Risk of Low Birthweight, 69 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 887 (1979).
101 Newborn intensive care units were first established in the 1960's and now can
be found in more than 600 U.S. hospitals. About 6% of all live-born infants are treated
in such units, at an annual cost most recently estimated (for 1978) at $1.5 billion. See
FOREGOING TREATMENT, supra note 45, at 203-04.
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available and covered by health insurance 10 2 despite costs that in a few days
can exceed the annual income of many Americans. 10 3 Once parents take an in-
fant home, they have found that in many cases services are nonexistent or dif-
ficult to obtain. 0 4
Compared to spending on medical care, funding for the prevention of han-
dicaps has been similarly scanty. 105 Strikingly, the Reagan administration's
strategy on the issue has focused on forcing hospitals to treat handicapped
newborns at the same time that the administration has cut funding for programs
with proven records of preventing birth defects1o6 and programs providing non-
medical services for the handicapped.1 0 7 In the few instances when these fac-
tors are even mentioned in the literature of handicapped newborns, they are
102 During the 1970's nearly every state passed laws requiring private insurers to
cover newborn intensive care, thus assuring the spread of such facilities. See id. at 203
n.28.
103 The cost can amount to $40,000. See Cheating Children, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1983, at 16E, col. 1. The average cost of a stay in a newborn unit in 1978 was $8,000.
FOREGOING TREATMENT, supra note 45, at 204.
104 Families "must often travel a financially and emotionally perilous path" to ob-
tain services for their infants rescued by newborn intensive care. FOREGOING TREATMENT,
supra note 45, at 205. One example is in obtaining intensive educational intervention
in infants with Down's syndrome and other handicapping conditions. This early educa-
tion has been proven so effective that in some cases such children have been able to
enroll in regular school rather than special education programs. But such intervention
is offered only on a pilot basis. See Examination of the Implementation of the
Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Han-
dicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
119-20 (1981) (statement of Dr. Norris G. Haring) [hereinafter cited as Haring]. The
Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. IV), does
not pay for services until age three and even then many eligible children do not receive
services for which they qualify. See Haring, supra, at 114, 119. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Act to require only that the state provide services sufficient to enable
a child to benefit educationally, not that a state try to equalize educational opportunities
for handicapped and non-handicapped children. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1982) (school need not provide interpreter for deaf student).
105 See G. BREWER & J. KAKALIK, HANDICAPPED CHILDREN - STRATEGIES FOR IMPROV-
ING SERVICES (1979) (only 1% of government spending on handicapped in mid-1970 went
to prevention).
106 The Reagan administration has cut nutritional programs for poor pregnant and
nursing mothers that were shown to reduce infant deaths. Even before the budget cuts
the programs did not reach a majority of those eligible. See Robin, A Right to the Tree
of Life, The Nation, June 9, 1984 at 698-99; Are Program Cuts Linked to Increased In-
fant Deaths?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1983, at 6E, col. 1; Some of the budget cuts in maternal
and child health grants to the states were restored in 1984, and Congress also mandated
Medicaid coverage for many indigent children and pregnant women previously left to
state option. Deficite Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEWS (98 Stat.) § 2361(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II)). See Health
Care for the Poor in 1984, Clearinghouse Rev., Jan. 1985 at 986.
107 See Examination of the Implementation of the Developmental Disabilities Bill
of Rights Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-28 (1981) in which the director
of the program coordinating office of the Office of Human Development Services, testified
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treated as less urgent than the question of individual decisions and thus able
to be put off to another day,"0 8 or simply dismissed as interesting but inconse-
quential background material.19
The relationship between this neglect of resource allocation issues and the
legal structure of health care is less direct than in the case of physician dominance
over parents.110 The medical profession determines the amount society spends
on newborn intensive care through the establishment of professional standards
concerning the administration's proposal to consolidate handicapped programs into block
grants to the states accompanied by a 25% overall funding cut. Since only a few states
mandate comprehensive services for the handicapped, the block grant system forces the
handicapped to compete with other recipients of social services for scarce discretionary
funds. See FOREGOING TREATMENT, supra note 45, at 206 n.40.
The Child Abuse Amendments of 1)84 acknowledge this issue by providing for grants
to the states to coordinate social and health services for families with handicapped in-
fants and by requiring the Secretary of HHS to make recommendations to Congress
on the use of federal funds for social services for such families and infants. Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & NEWS (98 Stat.)
§§ 123, 125 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1305, 5103).
108 See, e.g., Jonsen, Phibbs, Tooley & Garland, Critical Issues in Newborn Inten-
sive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal, 55 PEDIATRIcS 756, 757 (1975) (issues
of clinical decision-making must be considered before social issues of resource allocations).
109 Perhaps the most prominent example is the recent presidential commission report,
FOREGOING TREATMENT, supra note 45. After describing the role of resource allocations
in determining how many seriously ill infants are born and how many can benefit from
medical and other treatment, id. at 201-07, the commission devoted nearly all of its discus-
sion and recommendations to improving decision-making by doctors and parents. Id.
at 207-28. It devoted three paragraphs to suggesting increased public funding for post-
hospital care for rescued children. Id. at 228-29. There is a striking contrast between
this fleeting mention and the careful specificity and detail of the commission's recom-
mendations on individual decision-making. See also Kelsey, Which Infants Should Live?
Who Should Decide? An Interview with Dr. Raymond S. Duff, HASTINGS CENTER REP.
Apr. 1975 at 5, 6 (funding for institutions for handicapped is irrelevant to hospital treat-
ment decisions).
110 There is another link between the resource allocation issue and physician
dominance over parents which can be seen by contrasting two approaches to the tragic
dilemma faced by parents in any individual case. The common approach, fostered by
the medical model and ignoring the resource allocation issue, regards this tragedy as
entirely private: by an act of pure fate, parents are faced with a choice between deliberately
letting their child die when the capability is at hand to save its life, or rescuing the child
only to consign the child (and possibly themselves) to an uncertain future of suffering.
Under an alternative approach stressing the role of resource allocation decisions, fate
is still present, in assigning the tragedy to this set of parents rather than some other;
however because social choices affected the creation of the tragedy, the tragedy becomes
more public than private. The tragic choice is thus between making a heroic medical
rescue of an infant whom society will later judge not worth saving, or, on the other
hand, choosing not to rescue and thus affirming the child's lack of value to society.
For parents, each of these approaches carries its own appropriate response. The
common approach, by isolating and privatizing the tragedy of individual cases, en-
courages parents to retreat into their own sorrow. The alternative approach links in-
dividual cases together and urges parents to lobby for community resources to ease their
dilemma. The common approach is clearly far more amenable to physician control than
the alternative.
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determining which infants should receive such care. But the profession does
not, of course, directly set spending priorities for birth defects prevention or
handicapped rehabilitation programs. Yet the legal regulation of health care
ensures that even when physicians are not directly in charge of a decision, theirs
is the profession with the greatest expertise concerning society's health needs.
Their professional view of health and illness, what I have called the medical
model, has been institutionalized through a variety of legal regulations as
superior to other theories of health and illness. Thus it should not be surprising
that even when decisions are made by non-physicians, they follow the medical
model by placing primary importance on curing illness in individuals by
tiological means, rather than by preventing and ameliorating illness through
social interventions such as dietary program for pregnant mothers and improved
educational programs for handicapped children.
There is a paradox here: physicians have been firmly established as society's
official health experts, yet the medical model on which their expert authority
is based contains an exceedingly narrow view of illness. This paradox helps ex-
plain the lack of attention given to rationalizing the medical and non-medical
aspects of caring for handicapped infants. The profession's putative expertise
maintains its preeminent role in health policy, yet because that expertise exists
only over a narrow range of the issue, it is necessary for the profession to assert
that the aspect of health over which it is expert is the centrally important aspect
of health. Thus there is a need to minimize non-medical aspects of illness if the
profession is to maintain its dominance.
The medical model, then, fosters an approach to the problem of handicap-
ped infants that obscures the fact that the current system of spending exacer-
bates the tragic element in the birth of a handicapped infant. A different focus,
on the social roots of birth defects, would threaten the prominence that medical
care spending now enjoys in our social priorities.
IV. THE FLAWS IN THE PRESUMPTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL AUTHORITY
The paradox between narrow expertise and broad authority helps explain
why the focus of discussion about handicapped newborns tends to be directed
away from resource allocation issues. It also explains why the legal system main-
taining the medical profession's dominance is based on a fundamentally flawed
premise. Professional expertise, properly understood, cannot justify the kind
of autonomy granted to the medical profession. The problem of handicapped
infants again helps illustrate why this is so.
Aside from a few of the most severe birth defects, for which virtually any
known medical treatment would be futile, physicians disagree about which
defects warrant decisions to withhold lifesaving treatment.' This disagreement
I" See supra note 67. Anencephaly is the only condition for which physicians almost
unanimously agree that treatment is inappropriate. Shaw, Randolph & Manard, supra
note 68, at 590; D. CRANE, supra note 68, at 44. This agreement is not based solely on
the fact that the infant will die in a few days. Crane found that physicians were six times
more likely (25% vs. 4%) to treat an infant with an inoperable heart defect (hypoplastic
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involves elements of both expert and non-expert knowledge. It takes expert
knowledge to determine whether a given infant has a certain handicap, and ex-
pert knowledge to weigh the probable outcomes of the medical treatments
available. 1 12 But this factual knowledge can never form the sole basis for a deci-
sion not to treat an infant. That decision rests on normative judgments and
assessments of non-medical factors that lie beyond medical expertise.
The normative assessments are made in regard to, first, what kind of life is
worth living,"' and second, from whose perspective that first question should
be considered: the infant's, his caretakers', or someone else's. 114 These
assessments involve personal and philosophical considerations that cannot be
said to be within the technical expertise of professionals trained in biological
science." 5
left ventricle) even though an early death was as certain as for the anencephalic infant.
Id. at 44.
Surveys have consistently shown an almost even split among physicians on whether
they would treat a Down's infant. Id. at 44-45; Shaw, Randolph & Manard, supra note
68, at 590 (49.5 % of pediatric specialists in sample would acquiesce in parents' decision
to refuse consent for surgery on newborn with Down's syndrome and intestinal obstruc-
tion); Todres, Krane, Howell & Shannon, supra note 90, at 198 (51% of pediatricians
would recommend surgery for child with Down's syndrome and duodenal obstruction).
There is also significant disagreement for spina bifida and other handicaps. Id.
112 However, even in this area of presumptive expert authority, there is pervasive
uncertainty about the outcomes of treatment which erodes the degree of deference that
is appropriate for such expert judgments. See Jonsen & Lister, Newborn Intensive Care:
The Ethical Problems, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1978 at 15. Physicians who deliver
infants are often not aware of advances in newborn care, and thus underestimate an
infant's chances. See Goldenberg, Nelson, Dyer & Wayne, The Variability of Viability:
The Effect of Physicians' Perceptions of Viability on the Survival of Very Low-Birth
Weight Infants, 143 Am. J. OBsTEr. & GYNECOL. 678, 683 (1982).
113 Even if physicians could predict the outcomes of treatment with complete cer-
tainty, see supra note 112, deciding whether to treat is impossible without at least im-
plicitly answering this question. See Jonsen & Lister, supra note 112, at 17-18.
The sharp division among similarly trained physicians about which birth defects
are appropriate for non-treatment is itself evidence that the dispute lies beyond the realm
of technical expertise. It is thus not surprising that one of the strongest factors associated
with a physician's attitude toward treatment is his or her religious affiliation and degree
of religious activity. See D. Crane, supra note 68, at 203. Cf. Shaw, Randolph & Manard,
supra note 68, at 591 (willingness to obtain court order to overcome parental resistance
to surgery for defective newborn associated with physician's religious affiliation).
114 This is often obfuscated by being treated as a broad "quality of life" question,
without considering quality to whom. See Shaw, Randolph & Manard, supra note 68,
at 596 (division among physicians about whether Down's infants should be treated for
intestinal blockage had little to do with physicians' factual assessment of prognosis but
rather was "strongly associated" with physicians' belief as to whether infant or family
should take first priority in deciding treatment).
"I See H. FABREGA, DISEASE AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 218-19 (1974) (narrow biological
definition of disease held by physicians commits them to a role as biological engineers
and technicians; a more holistic definition would require systematic re-education of
physicians).
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The factual assessments are made in regard to the social dimension of illness.
When complete cure cannot be offered for an illness, such as when a newborn
has permanent physical or mental handicaps, then the consequences of the ill-
ness depend on the patient's adaptability to his social environment.116 That adap-
tability depends not only on what the child can do but on what others are will-
ing to do to adapt the environment to the child. This in turn depends on in-
tangibles such as the acceptance of a child in his home as well as on the quality
of community resources such as schools, physical therapy, and live-in institu-
tions. 117 Physicians make decisions about newborns based on their own assess-
ment of these social conditions even though they have no particular expertise
and may be relying on outdated stereotypes, such as the belief that most han-
dicapped persons must be institutionalized and that such institutions are in-
variably substandard. 1" 8
The handicapped-infant issue is only one example of the mixture of expert
and non-expert knowledge required to make health decisions. Every health deci-
sion involves a judgment of what is best for the individual being treated. That
judgment cannot be made without a normative assessment of what is valuable
for that individual. Health itself is a normative concept measured by social stand-
ards, not exclusively by scientifically objective criteria." 9 In cancer therapy,
for example, a physician may set five-year survival as the health goal where
the patient might choose instead to have a better quality life, even if a shorter
one, by avoiding disfiguring surgery or debilitating chemotherapy.120 No ob-
jective standard exists for saying the physician's choice is superior to the pa-
tient's. Indeed, any decision about health involves value judgments over which
no one can claim objective expertise. 12 Even a decision as fundamental to pro-
fessional autonomy as setting standards for professional competence requires
value judgments not amenable to professional expertise. For example, too high
a standard of competence can conflict with the value of accessibility to health
116 Any judgment of abnormality makes reference to what is normatively desirable
for a given social context. See G. CANGUILHEM, ON THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL
118 (C. Fawcett trans. 1978); Dubos, Health as Ability to Function, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 96, 98-99 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds. 1978).
117 See, e.g., Rynders, Spiker & Horrobin, Underestimating the Educability of Down's
Syndrome Children: Examination of Methodological Problems in Recent Literature, 82
AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 440, 445-46 (1978) ("early intervention" programs have had
marked success in improving IQ and other performance standards in Down's children.).
There are now more than 4,000 community residential facilities for retarded persons
operating as an alternative to large institutions. D. MACMILLAN, supra note 98, at 582-83.
118 See Duff, supra note 98, at 316; D. MACMILLAN, supra note 98, at 542.
119 A number of philosophers have made this point. See, e.g., Boorse, On the Distinc-
tion between Disease and Illness, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIo-Hics 114 (T. Beauchamp
& L. Walters eds. 1978); Sedgwick, What is "Illness"?, in id. at 120.
120 See, e.g., Fisher, Surgery of Primary Breast Cancer in BREAST CANCER 35-36 (W.
McGuire ed. 1977) (prominent cancer specialist maintaining that primary aim of treat-
ment is disease-free life; attainment of best cosmesis and quality of life are secondary aims).
121 See Pellegrino, The Anatomy of Clinical Judgments, in CLINICAL JUDGMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 178-79 (T. Engelhardt ed. 1979).
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care at a reasonable price. Too great a stress in medical school curricula on
training physicians for expensive, sophisticated treatment of present patients
can interfere with society's desire to allocate medical resources toward preven-
tive treatment of future patients.
When physicians dominate decision-making about whether to treat handicap-
ped newborns, they are inevitably in a position to impose their values on the
parents. If this clash of values were starkly apparent to parents, or to outside
regulators, it would be much easier to resist the dominance of physicians. But
the grant of legal autonomy to the medical profession blurs the boundaries of
professional expertise. It grants physicians broad authority to make choices on
behalf of patients; yet those choices involve factors beyond the expertise of physi-
cians. To maintain their right to professional autonomy, physicians must
characterize the decisions they make as technical and esoteric beyond lay
understanding, and they must ignore or conceal the non-expert elements of their
decisions. To acknowledge the pervasive value judgments present in their deci-
sions would require physicians to share their decision-making power with pa-
tients and with lay policy-makers. With such shared authority the justification
for the present policy of deference to professional judgments over a broad range
of health issues would collapse.
This fundamental flaw in the presumption of expertise underlying the grant
of professional autonomy creates additional problems for the medical profes-
sion. That is because the validity of the second main presumption underlying
autonomy, professional ethicality, depends on the validity of the first presump-
tion of expertise. Ethicality requires physicians to do what is in their patients'
best interests, but first they must know what in fact is in their patients' interest.
Professional autonomy presumes physicians should have decision-making
authority over patients because physicians know patients' interests better than
patients do.122 But we have seen that this is simply false. It is of course possible
that in any individual case, a physician can make a decision that is fortuitously
in his or her patient's best interest. But this cannot justify special decision-making
authority for the physician, because the physician's choice can just as easily
conflict with the patient's interest.
Moreover, the broad grant of professional autonomy is itself in fundamental
conflict with the notion of ethical decision-making for patients. In order for
society to grant self-regulation to the medical profession, that self-regulation
must serve the interest of both society and patients. Patients are interested in
maximizing their individual health consistent with their other goals. If this is
society's only interest as well, then an adequate societal check on the authority
of physicians would be to enforce the ethical mandate that the patient's interests
should take precedence over the physician's personal interests. 123 But there are
122 See R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 149 (1981) ("the Hippocratic ethic
gives remarkable authority to the physician to use his judgment to decide what will be
beneficial. The oath says, 'I will follow that system... which, according to my ability
and judgment, I consider for the benefit of the sick."').
123 See J. BERLANT, supra note 6, at 29-31.
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many occasions when social utility and individual utility are at odds, such as
when society seeks medical cost containment and patients seek more care, 1 4
or when society maintains income differences among social classes that con-
tribute to mental retardation and other birth problems. 125 Medicine is usually
oriented to serving the individual. But it relies on the state for its grant of
autonomy. Thus, a too-avid pursuit of the needs or rights of individual pa-
tients can risk autonomy when those clash with societal interests. 12 6 At the least,
individual physicians are tempted to temper their patient advocacy when they
perceive such a clash. 12 7 Beyond the level of the individual practitioner, the pro-
fession as an institution is tempted to ignore the societal causes of illness -
such as the roots of some birth defects in poverty - that if attacked would
upset the existing order.
128
124 Significantly, physician autonomy has been most restricted in this area of the
most obvious clashes between the interests of society and of patients. The share of the
gross national product devoted to medical care doubled from 1940 to 1975 and is still
rising. Klarman, The Financing of Health Care, 106 DAEDALUS 215 (1977). Federal regula-
tion has been aimed both at increasing competition among physicians, see COMPETITION
IN TE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (W. Greenberg ed. 1978), and
at restraining physicians' expenditures on behalf of patients through the PSRO and HSA
programs. See generally Gordon, Howell & Alexander, Is Government Regulation
Helpful? in ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE REGULATION (R. Gordon ed. 1980) (describing varie-
ty of government regulatory efforts all aimed at containing costs).
125 See supra note 99. See generally G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES
(1978) (society makes choices for death and illness by resource allocation decisions).
126 See J. BERLANT, supra note 6, at 250-52, 305-06 (status of profession attained
by "constellation of compatible interests" between profession and powerful elite); E. FREID-
SON, supra note 25, at 72-73 (society's "dominant elite" must remain persuaded of
harmlessness of the profession if it is to retain privileged status).
Compare Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (upholding state licensure of
physicians as legitimate health-related restriction) with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 63 (1905) (striking down health-related restriction on bakers, and citing with ap-
proval invalidation by state courts of licensing of other occupations such as horseshoe-
ing, but failing to distinguish medical licensure or to mention Dent). This dichotomy
is explainable not simply by the fact that lawyer-judges felt a professional kinship with
physicians, but by the fact that medicine served the kinds of capitalist class interests
that the Supreme Court in that era openly promoted.
127 See, e.g., Shaw, Randolph & Manard, supra note 68, at 596 (56% of surgeons
and 41% of pediatricians place family's interests ahead of infarit's, and this significantly
affected outcome of decisions); Matson, Surgical Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 42
PEDIATRICS 225, 226 (1968) (physician states doctors have responsibility to society not
to prolong expensive care for severly handicapped newborns).
But while society has an interest in limiting its expenditures on behalf of the han-
dicapped, see Lee, Jonsen & Dooley, Social and Economic Factors Affecting Public Policy
and Decision Making in the Care of the Defective Newborn, in Swinyard, supra note
69, at 315, such cost-benefit calculations are almost never made explicitly when deciding
individual cases. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 21 (1978).
128 Radical critics maintain that medicine's focus on individual-centered, biological
causes and cures for illness serves to depoliticize social causes of illness and thus decrease
pressure for income redistribution, workplace reforms and other measures threatening
the status quo. See, e.g., Figlio, Chlorosis and Chronic Disease in 19th-Century Britain:
The Social Constitution of Somatic Illness in a Capitalist Society, 8 INT'L. J. HEALTH
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The issue of handicapped newborns thus manifests a number of the inherent
problems in professional autonomy. It shows how physicians dominate patients
(or in this case patient representatives) in one area of health care where such
dominance seems clearly inappropriate. It also shows how professional
autonomy exacerbates the problem of handicapped newborns through the lack
of attention to rationalizing resource allocations. Yet what is even more signifi-
cant is that it is not just the mere fact of physician dominance that causes such
problems, but the flawed presumptions underlying the legal grant of autonomy
to the medical profession. Those presumptions of professional expertise and
ethicality are necessary to the grant of autonomy, yet are demonstrably false.
But legal autonomy establishes the concept of professional expertise as an ob-
jective fact rather than an ideological assertion. Yet its success at so characterizing
professional expertise bears a heavy price: it confuses for all of us the limits
of professional expertise and the proper role of doctors, patients, and the public
in making decisions about health.
V. CONCLUSION: REDEFINING MEDICAL AUTHORITY
In our society, dominance by one group over another can arise only from
a claim of legal right or, more effectively, from the consent of those dominated.
Medicine achieves its dominance over patients and over social debate about
health by teaching us to think about health and illness in its terms. Once we
accept the notion of illness as an objective, scientific phenomenon rather than
a value-laden social construct, we are prepared to surrender authority over this
realm of life to a group of experts. Once authority has been surrendered, a
powerful symbiosis takes place between the system of legal rules and the system
of professional thought to hold that professional authority in place. The legal
rules assume and reinforce the correctness of the system of professional thought,
and thereby legal right and consent become fused as one unified justification
for professional dominance. Professional authority attains all the more power
because by virtue of its authority the professional group gains an elite status
that it has a strong self-interest in maintaining. This self-interest provides the
motive for the profession to paper over the problems in its model of illness and
the related flaws in the concept of professional expertise. The irony is that the
grant of autonomy to the profession itself discourages a clear recognition of
the flaws in professional autonomy.
Up to now, the medical profession has been strikingly successful at hiding
the vulnerability of its claim to legal autonomy. Evidence of this can be found,
SERVICES 589, 605-12 (1978) (power of medicine lies in its putative objectivity when asser-
ting illness is primarily a problem of and in individuals rather than one of social pro-
cesses); Renaud, Structural Constraints to State Intervention, in THE CULTURAL CRISIS
OF MODERN MEDICINE 109 (J. Ehrenreich ed. 1978) (through medical paradigm, society
is "epistemologically eliminated as an important element in the etiology of disease");
Waitzkin, A Marxist View of Medical Care, 89 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 264, 270 (1978)
(medical ideology focuses on preventing illness through "victim-blaming" lifestyle change
and reinforces domination of social life by elite experts rather than democratic choice).
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for example, in its so-far-successful effort to avoid new regulation in the infan-
ticide controversy, 129 its undermining of informed consent law with the coopera-
tion of the courts and legislatures,130 and its retention of control over state licen-
sing boards131 in the face of controversy about anemic professional self-discipline.
The push to make the profession more competitive through the antitrust laws
and other regulatory efforts, far from providing contrary evidence, further
demonstrates the power of the concept of legal autonomy. Such efforts have
tried to distinguish between the economic context of medical practice, regard-
ed as a legitimate target of reform, and the clinical content of medical practice,
regarded as still within the exclusive sphere of professional self-regulation. 132
These efforts have thus tried to purify professional self-regulation by eliminating
the more egregious forms of self-interest from professional practice. These ef-
forts thereby continue to hold out the possibility of self-regulation based on
professional expertise, so long as the profession is disciplined into living up to
its ethical ideal of placing patients' interests above those of professionals.
Yet while the ideology of professional authority is tenacious, it is not invin-
cible. There are ways to begin reform that would not amount to an overnight
revolution in health care regulation but that would set out on the path of en-
ding control over decisions by a professional elite. One straightforward possibili-
ty would be to replace the system of medical licensure with a system of cer-
tification. This would limit the right of a person to call himself or herself a doc-
tor but would not, in contrast to the current system of legal restrictions on the
practice of medicine, prevent health care workers with non-medical healing
philosophies from treating patients independently from physicians. The main
difference between licensure and certification, then, is that certification allows
greater patient choice.
Certification has been proposed as a way of increasing economic competi-
tion in health care, 33 but its possible effects on increasing ideological competi-
tion have not been appreciated. This can be seen in the case of withholding
129 See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984); American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). The new legislation
passed by Congress, see supra note 4, which obtained the acquiescence of all relevant
medical groups except for the American Medical Association, represents only a modest
inroad on this autonomy.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
131 Several commentators have proposed that licensing boards should be comprised
only of persons from outside the licensed profession. See, e.g., Rayack, Medical Licen-
sure, Social Costs and Social Benefits, 7 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 147, 155 (1983); Cohen,
On Professional Power and Conflict of Interest: State Licensing Boards on Trial, 5 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y. & LAW 291, 304 (1980). No state as of 1980 had even a majority
of non-physicians on medical licensing boards. See H. SHUCHMAN, supra note 17, at 197.
132 See, e.g., Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges,
70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 607-08 (1982); American Medical Ass'n. v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443,
452 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
113 See, e.g., V. FucHs, supra note 16, at 61; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 137-60.
Such a proposal also was made recently in California. See Public Affairs Research
Group, Public Regulation of Health-Care Occupations in California, (final report, un-
dated) (recommendation to state Board of Medical Quality Assurance to end statutory
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treatment from ill infants. If physicians' legal authority over other health care
workers was loosened, many more health-care workers would be able to take
a greater role in the decision-making dialogue.1 3 4 Nurses and social workers,
in particular, would no longer have to limit their communication with parents
to make sure parents were faced with a "united front." Parents who have been
told by a physician all that is physiologically wrong with their infant can receive
a sharply different perspective from the nurse who provides the nurturing care
for the infant and thus is more acquainted with the infant as a whole person.
Social workers can present their own independent expertise about the integra-
tion of the infant into family and community. At the least, then, the substitu-
tion of collegial relationships for hierarchical ones on the hospital staff would
help assure that more facts could be brought to bear on decisions.
Perhaps more important than the facts they could offer is the independent
moral perspective these non-physician professionals could bring to making deci-
sions. Nurses, especially, have a professional ethic of respect for the individual
as a person that is at odds with the physician's utilitarian, paternalistic ethic.
This ethic, if effectively voiced, could have a significant impact on decision-
making. 13
In addition, if parents were given greater freedom to seek advice from non-
physician health care workers, physicians would have less ability to coerce them.
With collegial persuasion thus a more effective tool than paternalistic manipula-
tion of information to obtain "consent," physicians would be encouraged to
abandon their paternalism in favor of an ethic giving greater respect to patient
autonomy. 136
Of course, certification alone would not end physician dominance over
parents, nor unseat the dominance of the medical model in social debate about
health. It would, however, establish a new legal presumption that final deci-
sions in health matters should be left to the public and should not be vested
in any one profession. With this in place, we could begin to see the value-laden
nature of all health care decisions, both in social policy and at the level of in-
dividual decisions. Then we could begin to set policy not by delegation to a
professional elite but by democratic debate.
restrictions on the right to practice medicine and instead determine through licensing
those able to use the titles of physician, nurse, etc.).
134 A hospital itself could impose physician control on other professionals such as
nurses, but under a certification system, it would no longer have a legal imperative to
do so. With nursing and social work personnel increasingly scarce, hospitals would have
an incentive to attract such personnel by maximizing their independent status. A cer-
tification system thus offers no final answers to who would have ultimate control in
an intensive care nursery, but envisions that in the absence of legal hierarchy, such ques-
tions would be worked out dynamically in each hospital.
135 See supra note 83.
136 See generally P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 5-7 & n.5 (1970) (Kantian ethic
should control doctor/patient relations); Veatch, The Hippocratic Ethic: Consequen-
tialism, Individualism, and -Paternalism, in No RuSH To JUDGMENT 238, 250 (D. Smith
& L. Bernstein eds. 1978) (ethic of "doing right by the patient" is superior to one of do-
ing what will "benefit" the patient).

